Introduction: Pensions, Training and Workplace Commitment
Labor economists have long investigated the conditions under which the enhancing of workplace commitments solves market failures of spot labor markets (Oi 1962 , Mincer 1983 , Lynch 1994 . Employer investment in worker training for firm-specific skills, for example, has been modeled as a function of employment security policies that bind workers to firms, such as pension and other tenure-related compensation mechanisms designed to elicit long-term worker commitment until retirement age. 2 This literature suggests that optimizing employers can benefit from long-term employment relations and that both training and pensions will be greater under such conditions.
Institutional voice models of employment contracts also suggest that unions want more training and pensions, but not necessarily of the amount and type optimal for employers. Voice models of unionism and of union-management cooperation have been shown to enhance longterm employment relations and to encourage productivity growth (Freeman and Medoff 1984; Black and Lynch 1997) . Union interests in and success at enhancing pensions are welldocumented (Freeman 1981) , and a basic voice model has long been considered an alternative to the optimizing personnel model of pension provision. Previous research on pensions has not, however, attempted to expand the voice model by incorporating adaptive employer responses to union effects.
Compared to pension effects, the role of union voice in training is less clear. Union membership generally is not highly correlated with the level of worker training, since training tends to be concentrated among exempt managers and professionals. Unions can affect workplace training directly by negotiating employee involvement and worker training agreements;
examples include the labor-management training and employee involvement programs bargained in the 1980s in a number of basic industries (Ferman et al 1991) . Unions can affect training indirectly if unions increase job tenure, which reduces employers' unit training costs; however, empirical studies show this effect to be weak. 3 As with the pension literature, research on training has not incorporated adaptive behavior by employers to union effects (Brown et al 1997) .
Unions may be more effective in enhancing training when jointly-negotiated programs are combined with negotiated contracts that make the employment relationship less casual. Such an example comes from the role of hiring halls and apprenticeship programs in the construction industry (Belman and Belzer 1997) , where multiemployer pensions allow construction workers to accrue benefits with a variety of employers. In this case, enhancing worker training and pensions can create long-term benefits for both employers and workers.
Despite some benefits of long-term employment relations, economic trends suggest that many companies are reducing their long-term commitments to their workers. 4 Recent declines in defined benefit pension coverage constitute one such indication. Although there is some controversy over trends in pension coverage rates, household data (Current Population Survey, April supplements) show a decline in pension participation for men, from over 54 percent in 1972 to 50 percent in 1993. Overall participation declined during the same period, from 46 percent to 43 percent.
Moreover, primary pension coverage increasingly is located in defined contribution plans, which do not provide as many incentives to employers or employees to maintain long-term relations as the heavily tenure-weighted defined benefit plans (Ippolito 1997) . The number of active private sector participants with primary coverage in defined benefit plans fell from 30 million in 1980 to 26 million in 1990 (amounting to a drop from 36 percent of private sector employment to 26 percent); during the same period primary defined contribution coverage rose from 6 million members to 16 million (EBRI 1995, Table 5 .1). Increasingly, defined contribution plans are moving away from wholly employer-financed to partly employer-financed (EBRI 1995, Table 2 .17).
These indicators of declining commitment require investigating the connections between certain kinds of pensions and worker training. Relative to the previous literature, we develop the institutional aspects of firm behavior that affect firm pension and training practices. More specifically, we consider union voice impacts upon pensions and training and relate these to bonding and shirking models of the labor contract.
We also consider the possibility that causal effects between pensions and training are bidirectional and model these with simultaneous equations. We already described the half of the model where the firm's need for trained workers and long term employment relationships necessitates the use of pensions. The second half of the process is modeled to account for unions' influence on the provision of pensions, which are a mandated bargaining topic. The empirical strategy thus uses unionism as the instrumental variable in a two-stage least squares estimation. We estimate first the institutional and individual determinants of pension coverage; then in the second stage we estimate training as a function of predicted pensions.
If pensions cause more training when the endogenous determinant of pensions and training are properly taken into account, then we can infer that firms choose to provide training in response to an institutional environment that favors pensions. Pensions and training would then be complements.
We also examine the impact of industry-wide multiemployer pension plans and training programs. In some industries, such as construction, unions are said to increase significantly the amount of pension coverage --mostly defined benefit --and training. Therefore, we explicitly 5 account for their institutional effect by including a construction multiemployer variable. The paper proceeds by first reviewing related studies and then developing alternative models of the relationship between pensions and training. After discussing the data and the empirical strategy, we present the results and conclusions.
Related Studies on Pensions and Training
Labor economists have long viewed employers' choice of employee benefits as a calculated paternalism (Ross 1958; Oi 1962; Lazear 1979) . Firms adopt defined benefit plan pensions to encourage workers to stay longer on the job -DB plans make the age-compensation profile steeper -in order to reap returns from firm-invested specific human capital. Although the theory enjoys wide currency, empirical attempts to test the connection between pensions and training directly are few in number. Even fewer studies examine differences between the effects of defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) pension plans upon tenure and the incentives to train. DB plans almost always improve pension benefits with job tenure, whereas DC plans generally do not. Vesting in DB plans usually begins after no more than five years.
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An earlier literature examined the pension-training link indirectly, by investigating the effects of pensions upon job tenure. Workers covered by pensions do experience lower turnover--as much as 50 percent lower--than those who are not covered. It is not clear, however, that pensions provide the turnover-reducing mechanism. Gustman and Steinmeier (1995) , for example, find that defined benefit and defined contribution plans are associated with similar reductions in separation rates, contrary to their different incentive effects. Gustman and Steinmeier suggest that lower turnover may result from efficiency wage premia rather than to pensions. A related study (Montgomery and Shaw 1992) 6 suggests that pensions exceed opportunity wages -implying that pensions are extracted rents -and that the premium rises with firm size. They find that wages and pensions are complements or weak substitutes. Also, workers in large firms give up fewer wages to get pensions than do workers in small firms. They did not distinguish between DB and DC plans. Even and MacPherson (1996) also test the relationship between pensions and labor turnover.
They hypothesize that firms concerned about turnover due to monitoring difficulties offer pensions that raise the cost of turnover and that monitoring concerns increase with firm size. Even and
MacPherson claim to find support for the optimal pension theory because firms without pensions exhibit a weak relationship between firm size and turnover. (They are puzzled by the finding that DC and DB plans have similar effect --the data on DC plans is older -1983.)
A recent study by Dorsey and MacPherson (1997) examines the empirical link between pension coverage -again, the type of pension is not specified--and worker training. They find a positive and significant relationship between pension coverage and the amount of worker training, after controlling for wage rates, company size, union status, marital status, age, race and gender. The likelihood of pension coverage is 7 to 10 percent higher with worker training than with no training. Dorsey and MacPherson do not use industry control variables and they do not attempt to examine how training decisions may be affected by the existence of pensions.
They do find that union status is correlated positively with pensions and negatively with training but do not control for occupation. We address their causality conclusion in this paper. Johnson (1996) considers the evidence that employer pension programs are structured to elicit the desired quantity of firm-specific training by their workers. 
Models of the Labor Contract
Under what circumstances do contracts between firms and workers yield high levels of both training and pension security? In human capital models, firms optimize their personnel policies subject to the technological constraints of firm-specific skills; in bonding and shirking models firms optimize to diminish monitoring costs. In institutional models, firms adapt to and create social-institutional forces. What may look like a unilateral choice may actually be an adjustment to social and industrial constraints concerning pension coverage. These constraints include tax favoritism and subsidies, government regulations, the preferences of workers, and the ability of unions to identify and give enhanced voice to collective worker preferences.
We also include a model in which firms are affected by actions of other firms in the industry. Firms garner rents if there is implicit collusion with other firms to take wages out of competition. Each firm also benefits if all firms in an industry -especially regionally --share in the cost of providing industry-specific public goods, such as legislative lobbying, promotion of the industry and, the focus of our study, general training and worker attachment to the industry.
Industry-wide defined benefit pensions can increase worker attachment to the industry.
Expanding from the above discussion, we discuss five models of the labor contract.
Although some of the models are more neoclassical in flavor and others are more institutional, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Model One: Spot Market Model--Pensions and Training as Substitutes
The spot market model for labor assumes that firms have no monitoring or information costs regarding their employees, and no firm-specific skills whose acquisition requires an investment that must be amortized over time. Under these conditions the firm has no particular interest in a long-term relationship with workers and therefore has no interest in providing a pension. Employers optimize by paying workers the value of the current marginal product and are indifferent between paying compensation as wages or as benefits. If workers have a pension, they have paid for it with a decreased wage. If workers have training, they have paid for it themselves.
In this model, if unions are present, they express a median voter workers' interest and trade wages for pensions (Freeman 1981) . Although training and unions may be each positively correlated with pensions, this could be a spurious relationship with other factors, such as firm size, that may influence workers' tastes for unions, training, and pensions. In the spot market model, i.e., in the short term, pensions and employer-provided (but employee-paid) training are alternative media in which workers receive wages. Pensions and training are perfect substitutes, not complements.
Model Two: Firm Optimizing Models--Pensions and Training as Complements
In traditional neoclassical models of long-run firm behavior, some firms work with firmspecific technologies. The resultant need for investment in specific skills provides incentives for these firms to train their workers and to encourage low turnover through various bonding mechanisms, such as steep earnings profiles and pensions. We therefore expect to find that training and pensions are positively correlated. In this model, after controlling for the other factors that determine pension coverage, training should be a positive predictor of pensions.
The causation can appear in the opposite direction as well. Consider firms that provide pensions for reasons other than protecting their training investments; for example, from a desire to meet quality competition for workers from other firms. Such firms will be more likely to is not a big issue. They do not test this explanation; it is a presumption based upon the absence of a relationship between size of firm and tenure among firms that do not provide a pension.
7

Model Three: Institutional-Voice Models with Bargained Pension Coverage
A problem with Model Two is that workers are presumed to be passive receivers of firms' optimizing offers and that only technology or monitoring costs are motivating the desire for firms desire to have long term contracts. Yet workers can influence the mix of wages, training and pensions. In these conditions, firms are adaptors and pensions and training can be substitutes or complements.
The industry norm and customs, public policy and unions all induce pension coverage.
Instead of just choosing training and then optimizing on the wage profile, firms may also be pushed into providing a pension (and other aspects of a long term contract). They then respond and adapt by taking advantage of the pressure for a pension and provide training. The result may be a higher level of training than employers would otherwise provide. In this scenario pensions and training are positively correlated. This view is Model 3a.
An alternative scenario -we shall refer to it as Model 3b -would have employers adapt differently to pension costs that increased beyond their desired amount because of tax law and union pressure. Overly high pension costs might motivate employers to reduce other nonwage labor costs, such as the amount of training. In this scenario pensions and training become substitutes.
Gross time series data do provide a prima facie case for one link in this model: from unionism to pension coverage. 8 The postwar growth and more recent decline of defined benefit plans are highly correlated with the growth and decline of unionism. The emergence of defined benefit plans occurred during World War II, when wage, price and excess profit controls encouraged the growth of nonwage compensation. Pensions, vacations, health insurance and training programs satisfied national goals to curb inflation because they constituted either in-kind or deferred compensation or increased productivity. Advance-funded, defined benefit pension plans allowed firms to put profits in a nontaxable form and helped unions acquire a popular benefit for their members. Cross-sectional data from the 1979 CPS pension supplement also show a strong unionnonunion differential in pension coverage, as well as a substantial impact of union-bargained pensions upon nonunion white collar employees (Freeman 1981) . Our tabulations of 1991 data for full-time private sector workers reveal a similar pattern: 76 percent of unionized workers were covered by a pension, compared to 50 percent of nonunion workers (see Table 1 ). By 1991, however, the union-nonunion differential is smaller than in 1979.
Model Four: A Model with Non-Bargained Pension Coverage
A substitute rather than complement relation between pensions and training can also be present if employers are providing a different kind of pension coverage, rather than just more than they want. While unions are strong advocates of defined benefit plans (Ippolito 1990 , McDonald 1985 ,. employers prefer defined contribution plans because they are cheaper to administer and they shift financial risk from employers to workers (Turner and Watanabe 1995) .
The shift toward defined contribution plans has taken several forms. In some cases employers terminate their defined benefit plans and substitute defined contribution plans. In others, defined contribution plans (and also 401k plans) are expanded while defined benefit plans are contracted. In still others, the initial pensions offered are defined contribution. These considerations predict that, once the union effect upon pensions is estimated, the remaining pensions are more likely to be defined contribution plans that do not contain bonding incentives and thus have negative effects on training. at over 8.6 million and then flattened out by 1993 at 8.5 million (Turner and Beller 1992, 592 ).
In 1993, multiemployer plan participants represented 20 percent of workers in defined benefit pension plans. Since approximately half of these participants are in construction trades pension plans (PBGC 1996), we focus further on this one industry.
The link between multiemployer plans in construction and the presence of negotiated and jointly-administered training programs is apparent in both crude time series and in our crosstabulations of the 1991 data. The growth and decline of registered apprenticeships, which are highly concentrated in construction, correlates closely with the growth and more recently the flattened growth in multiemployer defined benefit plan coverage. In 1970, about 378,000 apprentices were registered with state and Federal authorities (Employment and Training Reports 13 of the President, various years). Registration peaked in 1979 with over 425,000 apprentices, followed by a steep decline and a leveling off at 342,000 apprentices by 1993. Apprenticeships in construction are also highly correlated with the growth and recent steep decline in unionism (Bilginsoy and Philips 1996; Ghilarducci et al 1995) . Belman and Belzer (1997, 204-6) argue that unions play a central role in resolving the challenges faced by construction employers, workers, and the industry. Employers need access to a pool of skilled labor on short notice. Workers need an orderly way to locate their next job, contribute to pension and health plans, and maintain their skills. Hiring halls, apprenticeship programs and industry multiemployer plans tailored to regional concerns meet these needs.
However, changes in the legal environment in construction have led to a sharp decline in union density in the industry, from over 41 percent in 1970 to 22 percent in 1992 (Belman and Belzer 1997, 207) .
Our tabulations of 1991 CPS data (see Table 1 ) show that union-nonunion differentials in both pension and training coverage are greater in construction than in any other one-digit industry. Over half as many union construction workers report having training compared to nonunion construction workers. The advantage in pensions is large as well; the percent of unionized construction workers with pensions is 170 percent higher than the coverage rate for nonunion construction workers.
The existence of multiemployer pension plans presents a high profile anomaly for the hypothesis that pensions and training are substitutes, as in Model Two above. In some labor markets, employee careers typically involve numerous short stays with individual employers, who are often small and undercapitalized. These industries need a workforce with high levels of long-term investments in industry-specific skills. However, the industry is characterized by work that is sporadic --for example: discrete construction projects, the finding of a wide coal seam, a movie contract. Firms in such an industry want workers attached to their skills; but they have no incentive, given the nature of their production processes, to form long-term calculated paternalistic relationships with their workers.
In a number of such labor markets, unions have obtained contracts for the entire industry. These contracts have established multiemployer social insurance plans, especially pensions and health insurance. In the construction industry, these contracts have also established quite-developed industry-wide apprenticeship training programs.
Such multiemployer institutions resolve a problem derived from industry structures. The employers, as a group, have an interest in sharing the costs of industry-wide specific training if some entity would enforce the collective action to prevent the free rider problems. Often the only incentives for such firms to provide training and pensions arise from belonging to a multiemployer plan. By providing a public good, multiemployer plans have the potential to create complementarities that enhance skill development, productivity and pay without penalizing firm performance. Multiemployer plans help to correct a major public good problem when skills are industry, rather than firm-specific. 
The Data
We merged samples from the January 1991 CPS Training Supplement and the 1991
March and April CPS, following a method introduced by Dorsey and MacPherson (1997) . The merged dataset comprises over 11,000 full-time private sector employees between the ages of 25 and 64. For our purposes, this dataset has the great advantage of including data on pension coverage and participation (but not type of pension or generosity level); union membership and coverage; and training received since beginning current job. The absence of information on whether pension coverage is defined benefit or defined contribution is a weakness. The training question asks "Since you obtained your last job, did you take any training to improve your skills?" Because the timing of the training is not asked, measured training is not independent of job tenure. 11 Although the measures are imperfect, no other dataset contains all of these variables. Table 2 presents summary statistics for the sample. The first column covers the full sample and the remaining columns present summary statistics separately by pension coverage, training and unionization. The summary statistics indicate a positive correlation between pension coverage and unionization. They also show a positive relationship between pension coverage and training, which is consistent with the complementarities among these variables suggested earlier. These patterns motivate a more careful examination using multivariate methods.
Estimating Strategy
Given the above discussion of bi-causality in labor market models, it makes sense to describe the relationship in a simultaneous model and estimate it via a two-stage least-squares model. In the first equation we predict the probability of being in a pension using industry, occupational and demographic control variables and unionization as the omitted exogenous variable. We also add a variable to capture the effect of multiemployer pension plans in the construction industry that are initiated by the union, but not by the firm. Unionization is added to include the constraints and opportunities that firms face in collective bargaining. The predicted value of pensions is then used in the second stage of the regression to predict training.
Union membership is useful as the instrument because it is highly correlated with pension coverage and not correlated with training. In 1991, twice as many of union members had pension coverage compared to nonunion members. Moreover, while pensions constitute a mandatory topic for bargaining, training is not.
In summary, the pension equation is estimated with all the right hand variables, and training is estimated similarly, with the addition of predicted pension coverage and the exclusion of unionization.
Training = f (estimated pension, a dummy equal to one when the worker is in a pension
and in the construction industry, age, age squared, education, marital status, being female, 1-digit industry and 1-digit occupation).
Regression Results with Endogenous Provision of Pensions and Training
Tables 3 and 4 provide the results of probit estimations of pension coverage and training using unidirectional models. The results can be interpreted to confirm a firm-optimizing model.
Pension coverage appears positively and significant --which implies they are complements --when we reproduce and extend the Dorsey and MacPherson results, by controlling for industry and occupations in Table 4 . One comes to the same conclusion, however, when we reverse the implied causation and model pension coverage as the consequence of training decisions.
An expanded consideration of the institutional features of pension and training decisions helps untangle the confused causality. Consideration of the voice effects of workers requires a bidirectional model and a two stage estimating procedure to eliminate the now recognized correlation with the error term. The weakly significant coefficient on the unionization variable lends further support to its use as an instrument in the two-stage estimation reported below. An exogeneity test on the unionization instrumental variable verified its usefulness.
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In the training and pension unidirectional probits the demographic variables have the expected signs -married and more educated workers are more likely to have both pensions and training (see Tables 3 and 4) . Large employers are also more likely to have pensions and provide training. Managerial and professional workers have more pensions when compared to service and operative classifications and also more training when compared to other classifications. Table 4 , the coefficient on pensions switches signs and is now negative, and it remains significant. One explanation is that pension coverage (in the first stage, pension coverage was estimated controlling for factors determining pensions --including unionization and training) is provided at the expense of training dollars. This finding, which runs contrary to previous studies (Johnson 1996; Dorsey and MacPherson 1997) may suggest that pensions and training are substitutes and that one can have too many dollars spent on pensions because training will be reduced! This result may be more plausible if pension coverage is predominantly in defined contribution plans. Perhaps it is the defined contribution pension plans -with their very weak bonding properties --that force a tradeoff between pensions and training spending.
Next, we include multiemployer plans as a particular subset of defined benefit pensions that are institutionally linked with training institutions. Table 6 provides the results when a defined benefit multiemployer proxy in construction is added to the model. 13 The coefficient on the construction multiemployer plan proxy is quite strong, positive and significant. Unlike the results when general pension coverage is included, it appears that certain kinds of pension plans induce additional training.
Unionized workers in construction on average are highly trained; in many cases workers complete a four-year apprenticeship program. Yet such training is concentrated among younger workers and does not explain the overall training levels. Interviews with representatives of the construction trades suggested that the respondents to the CPS training supplement may be referring to safety training for all workers, which is included in most large construction projects and inherently embodies introductions to new machinery and work processes. Table 7 presents similar second stage results but uses a alternative instrumental variable --the union density of the state in which a respondent resides --and adds more variables. One goal is to explore the hypothesis that industry and community norms influence a firm's decisions to provide pensions and training in order to prevent unionization and remain competitive. Union density in a state picks up the norm effect. Detailed industry controls are added. Lastly, a control for wages (the natural log of earnings) takes into account any efficiency wage effects.
The results are similar to the first set of regressions that use union status of the worker rather than the state unionization density as the instrumental variable. The coefficient on the pension variable is still negative, suggesting that pension coverage (when type of pension coverage is suspected to be defined contribution coverage) is paid for with decreased training spending. However, as in the first set of regressions, the relationship between training and pensions is reversed when the pension is a defined benefit multiemployer plan in the construction industry. Controlling for wages does not alter the substitute relationship between general pension coverage and training, nor the complementarity effect between training and defined benefit, multiemployer construction pension plans. Higher wages do induce more training. Disaggregating manufacturing into durable and nondurable, and breaking down trade into retail and wholesale trade, and services into business, personal and entertainment services reveals that those in professional services and durable manufacturing will get slightly more training but, again, the results on the pension variables do not change. Finally, the length of tenure on the job slightly increased training but did not take away from the pension results.
In yet more two-stage least squares regressions, not reported here, we omitted the occupational variables and added a variable for the concentration of industry employees in managerial and professional occupations. The coefficient on the pension variable remained negative although insignificant while the defined benefit multiemployer construction variable stayed positive and significant. Another variable--percent of the industry organized--was slightly positively related to training and again did not change the results on the pension variables.
14 To summarize, in firm optimizing models a firm's decision to provide pensions that presumably increase job tenure is related with technological imperatives for specific training .
These models conclude that pension and training are complements. We find support for an expanded voice model in which pensions could be either complements or substitutes, depending upon the context in which pensions and training decisions are made. Our two-stage, bidirectional model shows that pensions negatively affect the amount of training, which implies that training and pensions are substitutes if workers demonstrate a preference for pension benefits.
The finding of a negative relationship suggests that pensions are becoming more concentrated in defined contribution plans and more short-term oriented. We also control for multiemployer pensions and the effects of collective action of workers and unions upon defined benefit plans and apprenticeships; in those contexts, we find that pensions and training are complementary. We find that this results hold when we use alternative methods of controlling institutional effects:
unionization by state, and controlling for industry, occupation and employer size.
Conclusions
We have addressed the view that pensions (and other benefits) result from a calculated paternalism that ties workers to firms and induces firms to invest in human capital that requires large upfront costs. This view focused on firms that were optimizing their labor compensation dollar without facing pressures from unions. We explored a variant of this model by proposing that firms adopt benefit and training programs when facing union and worker preferences for both. This adaptation model, which presupposes a simultaneous process, adds important insights to the standard theory and results that pensions are correlated with more training.
We showed that although pensions in general are weak substitutes for training, not all pensions are alike. Certain types of institutional contexts of pension provision induce worker training. Multiemployer plans in construction do induce complementary training effects.
Although the trend in multiemployer pension participation is flat and the number of apprenticeships is falling, recent union initiatives are leading to some new multiemployer plans.
Many of these are in the service sector and provide further examples of how pensions and training can become complements. In San Francisco, for example, the major hotels are working together with the union to expand multiemployer plans and training programs in order to enhance the skills and career tracks of their workers and compete on the basis of quality service. In New York City, hospitals and unions have sponsored similar programs. Whether such initiatives will continue to spread remains to be seen. Note: dF/dx is for a change in the dummy variables from 0 to 1. Omitted categories:
ARE TRAINING AND PENSIONS SUBSTITUTES OR COMPLEMENTS?
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CLASS OF THEORIES
(1) less than 25 employees; (2) agriculture; (3) managerial and professional. Note: dF/dx is for a change in the dummy variables from 0 to 1. Omitted categories:
(1) less than 25 employees; (2) agriculture; (3) managerial and professional. Note: Individuals are considered to be in a multi-employer plan if they have a pension, are in a union, and are in a nonmanagerial occupation in the construction industry.
Omitted categories:
(1) less than 25 employees; (2) agriculture; (3) managerial and professional. 2 See Gustman et al (1994) for a recent review of this literature.
3 Mincer (1983) argued that a) union seniority rules regarding promotions and wages implied that workers need less general training for advancement; and b) unions help reduce turnover, inducing firms to provide more specific training. Thus Mincer predicted that unions reduce general training but increase specific training. Mincer himself found no measured effect of unionization upon the amount of specific training. Other studies find that firms invest in general training even when employment security is weak (Brown et al 1997) , and that union reduction of turnover can induce general training investments (Farber 1980; Freeman and Medoff 1984) . The union impact may be greater when there are fewer reasons to provide training, as is the case in smaller firms.
11 The training questions also include information on type and location of training. Types of training include: basic reading, writing or math skills; computer-related skills; other technical skills that are occupation-specific; and managerial or supervisory skills. Location of training refers to whether offsite in a school or onsite, in a formal company training program or informally on-thejob (OJT). The Training Supplement also asks questions about skills required for the present job, training received previous to the current job, whether the training was through a joint labormanagement program, and whether it was an apprenticeship program leading to journey worker status. We used the additional questions on type and location of training (and interaction terms) to check the robustness of our results and found no changes in the results.
